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ABSTRACT
The last decade has seen an outpouring of scholarship on the economics of the Great
Depression.  If there is anything approaching a consensus, it is a synthetic view which admits a role
both for monetary policy mistakes and for the international monetary and financial system in
transmitting those destabilizing impulses to the rest of the world.  It explains the speed and extent
of the subsequent decline in terms of both banking crises and the collapse of the gold standard,
which conspired in placing deflationary pressure to different degrees on different countries.  And,
it explains the eventual recovery in terms of the abandonment of the gold standard, which facilitated
the pursuit of stabilizing monetary policies, but also in terms of the restoration of stability to banking
and financial systems, something that occurred at different times in different countries.  One way
of understanding the veneer of disputation on this consensus is that different elements dominated
in different countries.  For the United States, there is no denying the role of monetary policy
mistakes in the onset of the Depression, whereas for other countries international monetary
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1
Barry Eichengreen
University of California, Berkeley
I may have been the only one who noticed that 2002 was the tenth anniversary of Golden
Fetters, these kind of things tending to have significance only for the author.  Whatever impact
this volume may have had is due in no little part to the title, which invokes Keynes￿ description
of the impact of the gold standard on economic policy during the 1930s.  In fact, not everyone
thought that this title was particularly marketable.  I recently rediscovered a letter, circa 1991,
from my editor at Oxford University Press.  ￿￿Barry,￿ he wrote, ￿I have the impression that we
still don￿t have a final title that we all like...￿Golden Fetters￿ sounds just a little old
fashioned...Permit me to suggest that you should consider the following: ￿World Finance in
Chaos: How the Gold Standard Contributed to, and Prolonged, the Great Depression, 1919-1939￿
or ￿The Collapse of the World Financial System, 1919-1939.￿￿ Some advice, it would seem, is
best ignored.
This is not to say that scholars today necessarily agree that the gold standard was a central
factor in the Depression.  Not all economists place the same emphasis as I on the implications of
the operation of the international monetary system.  To be sure, it is now commonplace to regard
the depression of the 1930s as a global phenomenon, which is very different from the U.S.-
centric approach that long dominated the literature.
2  It is now standard to test hypotheses byKindleberger (1973) was a notable exception to this generalization.
3Temin famously made this point when he observed that a negative shock to output (an
autonomous fall in consumption in 1929) could in principle have caused the concurrent fall in
money, rather than a negative shock to money causing the fall in output.
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comparing countries that experienced relatively mild and severe depressions and by asking
whether their contrasting experiences can be explained by differences in their policies.  But it is
not universally agreed that the structure and operation of the interwar gold standard explain why
so many countries experienced sharp and disruptive downturns in the early 1930s, or that the
abandonment of the gold standard was the single most important factor shaping the course of
recovery.
Indeed, the last decade has seen an outpouring of scholarship disputing virtually every
aspect of the conventional wisdom on the Great Depression.  Where does it leave us?  How much
has been learned?  What questions remain to be addressed?  In this lecture, as in my book (some
habits die hard), I organize my answers to these questions around the three phases of the
depression ￿ the onset, the downward spiral, and the recovery.
1.  The Onset of the Great Depression
Four decades ago, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) made the case for U.S. monetary policy
as the key factor in the onset of the depression.  As reviewers from Tobin (1965) to Romer and
Romer (1989) have observed, it is the depth and breadth of historical detail that renders their
account so compelling.  The most difficult challenge for any analysis of money and output, and
hence for the monetary interpretation of the onset of the Great Depression, is the identification
problem.
3  Friedman and Schwartz used historical detail to make the case that the monetary4In particular, money was not tightened in response to the rapid growth of the mid-to-late
1920s, rapid growth which according to some theories could have been responsible for the
subsequent slump (thus causing money to respond to output, but not in ways that could be easily
picked up by Granger causality tests).
5The roles of liquidationism, the real bills doctrine, and renewed speculation are
emphasized by, respectively, DeLong (1990), Meltzer (2002), and Calomiris and Wheelock
(1998). 
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shock was autonomous and the fall in output was induced ￿ that causality ran from money to
output, in other words.  They documented the Fed￿s concern with excessive speculation and its
belief that the rise in share prices and the high level of turnover on the stock market were
diverting resources from more productive uses.  They showed how this belief led the Fed to raise
the discount rate repeatedly, especially following the death of Benjamin Strong and the ascent of
Adolph Miller, a diehard believer in the dangers of speculative excesses.  The implication was
that money was not tightened in response to the evolution of output.
4  Rather, it was tightened in
response to developments largely unrelated to the movement of output and employment.  The
monetary shock, in other words, was autonomous from this point of view.  
Friedman and Schwartz next argued that the untimely death of Strong and disputes among
regional reserve banks and between the reserve banks and the Federal Reserve Board prevented
policy from responding in its customary stabilizing fashion to the decline in industrial
production.  The inexperienced Federal Reserve Board had never encountered an analogous
peacetime recession.  Misinterpreting the real-bills doctrine, predisposed to a perverse and self-
fulfilling liquidationalist view of the business cycle, and preoccupied by the belief that monetary
ease might reignite speculation, it saw inaction as the appropriate policy response.
5  Rather than
loosening as output declined, monetary policy remained essentially immobilized.  6Ritschl and Woitek (2000) document this in a forecasting framework.  Their time series
analysis suggests that the effects of the Fed￿s discount policy remained ￿far too small to explain
the collapse in output after 1929" (p.11).  To put these changes in perspective, I calculate that the
Fed has typically (since 1951) raised the discount rate by 425 basis points between the trough and
the peak of the business cycle (as dated by the NBER).  By comparison, the tightening in 1928-
29 was 350 basis points, hardly out of the ordinary.  (This comparison assumes, of course, that
the 1926-7 slowdown was a business cycle trough, a characterization which would not be
universally accepted.)  The implication in the text only follows, of course, if one agrees that the
￿direct action￿ part of the Fed￿s initiative ultimately had little effect (which is my view).
7Note that the same problem arises in the immediate post-crash period.  The Fed actually
loosened quite significantly following the stock market crash, which makes it all the more
surprising that the economy contracted as rapidly as it did ￿ although one can certainly argue,
with benefit of hindsight that it did not loosen far or fast enough.
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This, then, was evidence of an autonomous monetary shock, reflecting the operation of a
unique and unprecedented set of historical circumstances.  This argument in turn encourages the
belief that monetary factors played an important role in the onset of the Depression.  
But there are problems with this U.S.-centered monetary interpretation of the slump. 
While the tightening of monetary policy through the summer of 1929 was not particularly
dramatic, the subsequent decline in activity was.
6  Recall that the Fed attempted to use ￿direct
action￿ to deny Wall Street credit for use in speculative activities.  Rather than simply relying on
the classic device of a higher discount rate to reduce the volume of credit for use in financing
brokers￿ loans (making it more expensive for banks to obtain credit from the Fed and thereby
forcing them to pass through that cost to their customers),  it applied moral suasion to the banks.  
It hesitated to make more active use of the conventional instruments and to tighten more sharply,
in other words.  Essentially, this is another way of saying that the Fed did not tighten as
aggressively as it felt that conditions warranted.
7  Thus, the first problem, to put it in the form of
a question, is: how could this modest monetary tightening produce such a sharp contraction in the8The Institut fur Konjunkturforschung￿s index of world industrial production fell by 10
per cent between 1929 and 1930.  (The League of Nations￿ index of mining and manufacturing
fell by 12 per cent.)  By comparison, the largest fall since 1971 in the IMF￿s index of world real
GDP was 1.5 per cent in 1982.
9In Germany, for example, recent national product estimates show that the peak was
reached in 1928.  Construction peaked in the summer of 1927, and the production of consumer
goods peaked in February 1928.  See Ritschl (1997, 1999). 
10U.S. merchandise imports peak in the first half of 1929, not in the first half of 1928. 




If the Fed￿s modest monetary tightening was not obviously sufficient to explain the
unusually sharp downturn in U.S. economic activity, then it was even less sufficient to explain
the unusually sharp downturn in the rest of the world.
8  This is the second problem: it is not clear
how modest monetary tightening in one country could have been responsible for the onset of a
depression that engulfed virtually the entire globe.
The third problem is related: a number of other countries ￿ Canada, Germany, Poland,
Argentina, Brazil, and Australia among them ￿ turned down before the United States.
9  The
model of international transmission in most older accounts ￿ inspired by the IS-LM model with
low capital mobility that was the workhorse for multi-country macroeconomic thought
experiments in the 1960s and 1970s ￿ is that the Fed￿s tightening led to a deceleration in growth
in the United States, which in turn led the U.S. to import less, transmitting the slowdown to other
countries.  Clearly, the actual sequence of events is all wrong for this story.
10
The gold standard ￿ and the fact that capital mobility was anything but low in the 1920s ￿
helps to resolve all three paradoxes.  Because capital was mobile and exchange rates were fixed,11Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) invoke this connection between gold standard credibility
and popular politics and provide supportive data for the interwar years.  Flandreau, Le Cacheaux
and Zumer (1998) challenge the applicability of the thesis to the period before 1913, but that is a
different question.
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higher interest rates in the United States meant higher interest rates in the rest of the world as a
result of the operation of interest arbitrage.  If market interest rates rose in the United States, they
also had to rise in other countries, as capital flowed toward the U.S. or at least flowed out of the
U.S. at a slower rate.  If foreign central banks failed to follow the Fed in raising discount rates,
they would suffer reserve losses, jeopardizing the stability of their currencies.  Because Europe
and Latin America had relatively weak balances of payments, reflecting the strengthened
competitive position in international markets for manufacturing exports acquired by the United
States during and after World War I and the weakness of agricultural and primary product prices
in the 1920s, their central banks could ill afford reserve losses.  Because their commitment to the
gold standard was uncertain, reflecting the expansion of the franchise and the inability of populist
governments to subordinate other goals of policy to the overarching imperative of exchange rate
stabilization, the tendency for capital flows to reverse direction and now flow not from but to the
United States raised doubts about the stability of currencies elsewhere.
11  This added a risk
premium to foreign interest rates.  Central banks thus had to respond by raising rates even more
sharply to calm skittish investors.  This is where the incomplete credibility of the interwar gold
standard enters the story.
Consequently, the restrictive turn in monetary policy in the United States provoked an
even more restrictive turn in monetary policy elsewhere.  The deceleration in the rate of money
growth in 1928 was even faster in Latin America and Europe than in the United States.  The7
same was again true in 1929.  The only region for which this was not the case was East Asia, not
surprisingly since Australia had already begun to tinker with its gold standard (in 1929), and
Japan was not on the gold standard at all, except for a few months in 1930-1.
Now consider again our three paradoxes.  That the shock was a global monetary
contraction and not just a U.S. monetary contraction helps to explain why the U.S. economy
turned down so sharply.  Exports were the first component of aggregate demand to begin falling,
indicative of the impact of the contraction in the rest of the world on the United States.  That
foreign central banks had to respond sharply helps to explain why foreign cycles peaked even
earlier.  The one factor that insulated U.S. economic activity from the effects of higher Federal
Reserve discount rates, namely the reversal of U.S. capital exports, further explains why other
countries began to contract before the United States.  It is revealing that the countries whose
business cycle peaks preceded that of the U.S. had been capital importers in the 1920s.  And, of
course, a global monetary shock works better than a U.S. monetary shock in explaining a global
recession.
There are two objections to this line of argumentation.  First, other factors could have
mattered more than tighter money for the onset of the depression.  Second, even if tighter money
was responsible, interest rates in other countries could have risen for unrelated reasons; the
tightening of monetary policy elsewhere, it could be argued, did not result from the international
transmission by the gold standard of tighter money in the United States.  
The operation of other factors was clearly evident in France, as I observed in my book
and Clark Johnson (1998) emphasized in his.  The Poincare stabilization raised French real
interest rates in the second half of 1926, as inflation came down but nominal interest rates12While the French central bank￿s revised statute limited the scope for conventional
expansionary open market operations, it still could have expanded domestic credit by
unconventional means such as purchasing foreign exchange on the open market.  Preoccupied
with inflation to the point of phobia, however, it hesitated to do so.  If this reference to the need
to use unconventional means and to the central bank￿s neurotic preoccupation with inflation
reminds readers of the Bank of Japan in the 1990s, my wording will have accomplished its goal.
13Schacht was also concerned about the high level of foreign borrowing; he saw the stock
market boom in Berlin and expansion in Germany in general as being fueled by unsustainable
capital inflows, which added to the country￿s already unsustainable external obligations, thereby
setting the economy up for an even more painful future fall.  The dilemma, then, was the same as
that facing any central banker confronting a problem of capital inflows: higher interest rates
might eventually prick the stock market bubble, but in the meantime they would only encourage
further capital inflows (as they did, in the German case, until the Fed responded in 1928 with
further increases in its discount rate).  Schacht￿s preferred solution, which is the medicine
nowadays recommended for countries experiencing difficult-to-manage capital inflows, was
fiscal restraint, but this was not something he could force on free-spending municipal
governments or Reich authorities feeling pressure from a variety of special interest groups.
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remained stuck in positive territory.  Higher real rates clearly made France a more attractive place
for portfolio capital; hence, funds flowed toward it and away from other countries.  High real
rates also made consumption and investment less attractive, strengthening the French current
account.  Lower nominal interest rates, for their part, stimulated the demand for money, which
could be met only by running a payments surplus and attracting gold from the rest of the world,
given the reluctance of the Bank of France to expand domestic credit.
12  For its own reasons,
then, France was an independent source of monetary deflation in the second half of the 1920s.
Germany is the other important country for which a case can be made (Balderston 1993,
Ritschl 1999).  The president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, also became
convinced of the dangers of a speculative bubble in the spring of 1927 and tightened credit (Voth
2002).
13  It is no coincidence that Schacht embraced a model similar to that of the governors of
the Federal Reserve System; the leading central banks were in regular contact in the second half14This line of argument also addresses a problem noted by Temin (1971), that the German
economy started turning down even before capital outflows from the U.S. were curtailed.
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of the 1920s.  Schacht too resorted to a policy of direct pressure, meeting with the directors of the
big Berlin banks to express his concerns.  Tighter money and credit succeeded in pushing down
the German stock market, as Schacht intended, but they also pushed down the German economy,
which was presumably not his intention.
14  
The other objection to the gold standard story is that it was not monetary policy but other
shocks and imbalances that caused the slump.  This returns us to the debate between Friedman
and Schwartz and Temin; indeed, it returns us to what was the debate in the 1930s.  After
experiencing the 1990s, observers are perhaps less inclined to find explanations for the downturn
in an autonomous fall in consumption spending and more likely to consider a role for the credit
boom, the stock market bubble and real estate speculation, for excessive optimism about the
commercial potential of information and communications technologies (in the 1920s, radio; in
the 1990s, the Internet), and for the naive belief that recessions had become a thing of the past. 
They see parallels, in other words, between the ￿new economy￿ of the 1990s and  the ￿new age￿
of the 1920s.  The culprit could have been technological change creating structural imbalances
that left the economy vulnerable to destabilizing shocks.  Many old industries were financially
fragile, and new ones like radio were not yet profitable.  Thus, even a minor shock, whatever its
source, could create financial stress.  This is the story told by Bernstein (1987) and elaborated by
Szostak (1995).  Alternatively, the culprit could have been overinvestment in property, which left
financial institutions exposed and bequeathed a legacy of inappropriately subdivided tracts that
depressed productivity through the 1930s (Field 1992).  15Similar country-specific stories are sometimes told for the UK (Heim 1984), but from a
macroeconomic point of view their limitations are the same.
10
These interpretations tend to be sector and country specific.  They focus on sectors like
radio, electricity, and residential construction and on a particular country, the United States.
15 
Unfortunately, it is not clear how sector-specific factors could have produced such a pronounced
economy-wide slump or how country-specific factors could have produced such a sharp global
downturn.  These alternatives thus reproduce a problem with the earlier literature: they are U.S.-
centric, analogous stories being harder to tell for the rest of the world.  And, as an explanation for
global macroeconomic trends, they lack a propagation mechanism.
One way of attempting to knit these stories together is by applying ￿the Bank for
International Settlements view￿ to the 1920s.  The BIS view, as informed by the experience of
the 1990s, is that pronounced credit booms set the stage for sharp economic downturns,
sometimes marked by financial crises.  Borio and Lowe (2002) develop indicators of credit
booms ￿ based on the rate of growth of bank credit, stock market valuations, and the investment
ratio ￿ and show that recessions and crises are most likely to follow when these indicators rise
relative to trend.  Their story runs as follows.  Loose credit conditions, produced by lax monetary
policy at the center and a combination of pegged exchange rates and implicit guarantees for bank
depositors at the periphery, fuel indiscriminate increases in bank lending.  The quality of bank
assets deteriorates, and when equity valuations and investment activity are disturbed by a shock
to confidence or a disturbance to the real economy, the banking system is forced to retrench.  As
firms are denied external finance, an unusually rapid decline in economic activity follows,
causing further distress in the financial system.  Capital flows reverse direction as investors begin16The weights are based on the signal-noise ratio of the indicators ￿ in other words, on the
number of crises that are corrected predicted by each indicator out of sample, relative to the
number of false positives, where the critical value taken as signaling a crisis is chosen to
maximize the probability of success. 
17This international average is the unweighted average of the 16 country cases for which
complete data are available.
18The typical t-statistic on the value of the composite indicator in 1928 in such a multiple
regression is consistent with statistical significance at the 95 but not the 99 per cent confidence
level.  For details, see Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003).
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to doubt the security of bank deposits and the stability of the currency.  In the worst case, both
banking and currency stability are threatened.
Together with Kris Mitchener, I have constructed composite indicators of credit
conditions for the 1920s (as in Borio and Lowe￿s work for the 1990s, a weighted average of
credit growth, stock market valuations, and the investment ratio).
16  As shown in Figure 1, the
composite indicator rises relative to trend after 1927, signaling turbulence ahead.
17  And, of
course, currency and banking crises followed.  The larger the credit boom circa 1928 (that is, the
greater the rise in the actual value of the composite indicator relative to trend), the larger the
subsequent fall in per capita GDP, as shown in Figure 2.  We see from the figure that the credit
boom-subsequent depression relationship is first and foremost a U.S. story, but a number of other
countries also experienced pronounced credit booms in the late 1920s, Canada, France, and Italy
among them, and suffered the consequences subsequently.  Multiple regressions including
controls for other country characteristics influencing their susceptibility to the international
slump (the size of the current account deficit in 1928, for example) do not weaken this
relationship.
18  Evidently, the transmission mechanism from the credit boom to the economic
slump resembles that sketched by the BIS in its studies of the credit-boom episodes of the 1980s19This was of course the period leading up to the default in Buenos Aires that precipitated
the famous Baring Crisis in London (Eichengreen 1999).
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and 1990s.
Credit booms had littered the 19th century financial landscape, of course.  They feature
prominently in Sprague￿s (1910) history of U.S. crises, and other countries, like Argentina in the
1880s, similarly displayed all the classic symptoms.
19  Typically, a combination of lax domestic
credit conditions and capital inflows fueled a railway- or public-utility-related construction
boom, investment in which was encouraged by government guarantees.  All this will be
unsurprising to economists familiar with more recent experience.  
Why, then, did none of these late-19th century episodes produce a slump as deep, long,
and widespread as the 1930s?  The competing answers focus, predictably, on U.S. and foreign
policies.  Before 1913, Treasury operations were capable of some monetary fine tuning, but there
was no central bank to behave in strongly destabilizing fashion.  The prewar gold standard
imposed automatic limits on the extent of credit fluctuations.  In the 1920s, in contrast, an
additional element of discretion was introduced.  The Fed kept interest rates too low for too long,
allowing the credit boom to develop, before ratcheting them up sharply.   The key mistake in this
view was at least as much that monetary policy was too loose before 1927 as that it was too tight
later.  The problem was not merely the gold standard, in other words; it was gold standard
management.
The limitation of this argument, once again, is that it does not explain why other countries
responded in like fashion.  Against the backdrop of ￿new age economics,￿ it can explain the U.S.
credit boom but not the global credit boom, unless we are prepared to assume that low interest20For those who recall textbook accounts in which the instability of the 1920s was a result
of misaligned exchange rates ￿ and specifically of Winston Churchill￿s ill-advised decision to
restore sterling￿s prewar parity in 1925 ￿ this is where these factors enter the story.  Sterling￿s
overvaluation compounded the problem of British unemployment and balance-of-payments
weakness.  More generally, the failure of central banks to force prices back down to prewar
levels before restoring convertibility at the prewar rate of exchange forced the interwar system to
operate on a narrower gold basis ￿ the real value of existing gold stocks would have been higher
had price levels been lower ￿ in the event leaving less margin for error.  The resulting global gold
shortage continues to be emphasized by authors writing in the tradition of Cassel (see Johnson
1998 and Mundell 2000).
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rates in a country accounting for less than a quarter of global output and 15 per cent of world
exports can explain financial developments throughout the world.
 Foreign policies were to blame insofar as other central banks similarly allowed interest
rates to remain too low for too long.  Countries like Britain were already suffering double-digit
unemployment, and raising interest rates would have only added to the problems of a politically-
challenged Conservative Government.  Part of what the governor of the Bank of England,
Montagu Norman, meant when he described the Bank as continuously ￿under the harrow￿ was
the political pressure he felt not to raise interest rates even when doing was dictated by gold
standard considerations.
20  Germany, for its part, had a moral hazard problem: tighter credit
which strengthened the balance of payments undermined the argument that the country was
incapable of meeting its reparations obligations.  The problem, in this view, was not so much
misguided policy in the United States as the politicization of policy in other countries.
Central banks￿ ill-conceived efforts to cooperate may have contributed to this situation. 
Benjamin Strong understood that his foreign counterparts, in particular Norman, were under
pressure not to raise interest rates.  If no other change took place, this might raise questions about
the credibility of Britain￿s commitment to the gold standard.  This was the motivation for the21In addition, I think that the critics exaggerate the role of international factors in
explaining the Fed￿s interest-rate cut in 1927.  In addition, the Fed was responding to the
slowdown in industrial production (as Henry Ford shut down his assembly lines to retool for the
Model A) and to distress in the agricultural Midwest due to depressed farm prices.  There was a
large element of unilateralism and self-interest, in other words, in the Fed￿s 1927 interest rate cut,
as opposed to international motives.
22As I describe below.
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secret meeting of central bankers on Long Island in May of 1927 ￿ the 1920s analog of ￿the
committee to save the world.￿   Rather than forcing the Bank of England to raise rates, as
dictated by the ￿rules of the game,￿ as a result of that meeting the Fed agreed to lower it￿s.  It was
at this point that the credit boom and the Wall Street bubble began to get out of hand.
This brings us to the role of central bank cooperation in the depression.  My emphasis on
need for cooperation to sustain the interwar gold standard when it came under threat and on its
inadequacy as a factor contributing to its collapse has come in for critical scrutiny (Flandreau
1997, Moure 2002).  The critics argue that cooperation was never really prevalent before 1913,
and that cooperation in the 1920s was in fact part of the problem, not part of the solution.  I think
these disagreements reflect a misunderstanding.
21  When analyzing the pre-1913 gold standard, I
pointed to the importance of ￿regime-preserving cooperation.￿  The argument was not that
central banks cooperated continuously when setting interest rates but that the leading central
banks and governments supported one another with emergency assistance in times of crisis.  This
prevented the collapse of any one key currency from jeopardizing the entire system and limited
the domestic financial repercussions.  It prevented pressures on particular currencies from
provoking systemic crises of the sort that erupted in the 1930s.
22  It was this regime-preserving
cooperation that was missing in the 1931, when the Bank of France hesitated to assist its23As the Fed did, for example, in September-October 1931 following Britain￿s
abandonment of the gold standard ￿ see below.  Say that the National Bank of Belgium sought to
liquidate its holdings of British treasury bills, and to replace them with gold in order to avoid
suffering capital losses on the former.  It would sell those bills on the British market for sterling
and present that sterling to the Bank of England for conversion into gold.  The Bank of England,
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Austrian and German counterparts and the BIS was prevented from doing so for a time by the
dispute over reparations, Germany￿s program of building pocket battle ships, and the proposal for
a Austro-German customs union (the latter in contravention of the Versailles Treaty).  There is
no contradiction between the argument that the absence of regime-preserving cooperation was
part of the problem in the 1930s, but that misguided cooperation of a different sort was equally
problematic in the 1920s. 
2.  The Downward Spiral
As output and asset prices began falling, banks experienced financial distress.  Since
borrowers￿ obligations were fixed in nominal terms, the fall in incomes led to a rise in
nonperforming loans.  Rising concern over the stability of the gold standard then led investors to
substitute gold for financial assets where doing so was permitted and central banks to liquidate
their foreign exchange reserves to avoid suffering capital losses in the event that reserve
currencies were devalued.
Under these circumstances, the gold standard became an engine of deflation.  Money
supplies were a multiple of the international reserve backing of central banks and governments. 
That backing contracted as central banks, fearful for the stability of the gold standard, liquidated
their foreign their exchange reserves.  Central banks whose obligations were reserve currencies,
suffering corresponding reserve losses, raised their discount rates to defend their parities.
23 experiencing gold losses, would then have to raise interest rates to limit the deterioration of its
position.  The National Bank of Belgium, to minimize its own reserve losses, would presumably
respond in kind.  The net effect would be a decline in reserve backing (since foreign exchange
reserves had declined but the amount of gold in the international system was fixed) and higher
interest rates all around ￿ two indications of deflationary pressure.  In fact, the Belgian case is an
interesting one.  The British authorities lobbied the National Bank to hold onto its sterling, as a
result of which the Belgian authorities suffered extensive capital losses when sterling was
ultimately devalued.
24In the short run, we can take the second term as given by the backing rules under which
the gold standard operated in each country, and the fourth term as fixed, reflecting the lagged
response of the gold-mining industry.
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Higher interest rates heightened the distress experienced by commercial banks with maturity
mismatches on their balance sheets.  They consequently sought to rebuild their liquidity and
reserves by calling in loans.  Depositors, with fears about the liquidity of the banks, fled into
currency.
Bernanke and Mihov (2000) decompose this process by writing the money stock (M1) as
follows:
M1 = (M1/BASE) x (BASE/INTRES) x (INTRES/GOLD) x GOLD
where BASE is currency in circulation plus the reserves of commercial banks, INTRES is the
country￿s international reserves (gold plus foreign exchange), and GOLD is the value of gold
reserves denominated in domestic currency.  The preceding discussion suggests that most of the
action in this product should have come from the first and third terms.
24  The first term, the
money multiplier, will fall as the worsening prospects of financial institutions lead depositors to
flee into cash and banks to call in their loans.  The third ratio, the international reserve multiplier25Of course, these were two of the countries that went off the gold standard toward the
end of 1931.  But the other two countries considered, Poland and Belgium, did not experience
declines in the M1/BASE ratio approaching that of the United States.
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(total international reserves relative to gold), will fall as central banks liquidate their foreign
currency assets.
How important were these components in producing the observed decline in money
stocks?  The INTRES/GOLD ratio fell from 1.27 at the end of 1929 to 1.25 at the end of 1930
and 1.12 at the end of 1931 in 26 countries (the 24 countries considered in Nurkse (1944),
Appendix II, plus the United States and the United Kingdom).  Other things equal, this implies a
12 per cent fall in global money supplies centered in calendar year 1931.  If we exclude the U.S.
and the UK, the principal reserve-currency countries (the ratio being fixed in the countries
issuing rather than holding foreign exchange reserves), the INTRES/GOLD ratio falls from 1.60
at the end of 1929 to 1.53 at the end of 1930 and 1.23 at the end of 1931.  For countries other
than the reserve centers, the corresponding fall in money supplies was then 23 per cent, ceteris
paribus.
While the INTRES/GOLD ratio fell across the board (except in the U.S. and the UK for
the aforementioned institutional reasons), the change in M1/BASE varied more across countries. 
Bernanke (1995) analyzes data for six countries, of which the largest fall was in the United States
(25 per cent), but in two of which (the UK and Sweden) the ratio instead rose between the end of
1929 and the end of 1931.
25  The weighted average for Bernanke￿s six countries (weighted by
1929 money supplies expressed in U.S. dollars) declined by 21 per cent.  The weighted average
excluding the U.S. was 11 per cent.  I undertook a broader comparison for a total of 31 countries;
in this larger sample, the weighted average decline excluding the U.S. (30 countries) was 10 per26The 30 countries in question were Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Uruguay.  Again, I took the weighted average by
converting M1 and the base into dollars at market exchange rates.
27In the U.K., in contrast, the M1/BASE ratio rose slightly between the end of 1929 and
the end of 1930 and fell slightly between the end of 1930 and the end of 1931, hence remaining
essentially unchanged over the period.  This stability reflects the absence of serious banking-




Evidently, then, the liquidation of foreign exchange reserves played a more important role
than the liquidation of bank deposits in the monetary contraction outside the United States.   The
U.S. was unusual in that the percentage fall in the M1/BASE ratio was larger than the percentage
fall in the INTRES/GOLD ratio.
27  (Recall that as the issuer of a reserve currency, the Fed, like
the Bank of England, held no foreign-exchange reserves.)  It is tempting to say that for the rest of
the world the collapse of the gold-exchange standard mattered more than the collapse of the
banking system, while the opposite was true for the United States.  It is not surprising from this
point of view that the literature on the global depression focuses on the gold standard while that
on the United States concentrates on the banking crisis.  
One should be cautious here, since banking and currency crises were related.  Currency
crises in other countries were one factor forcing the Fed to ratchet up interest rates in the final
months of 1931, contributing to the U.S. banking crises.  In countries experiencing both kinds of
crisis, the banking crisis typically became evident before the currency crisis.  All of the banking-
crisis episodes identified by Bernanke and James (1991) begin before the corresponding currency
crises in the same countries.  This same pattern ￿ banking crises first, currency crises second ￿ is28This is the famous finding of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998).
29Recall that this is the same critique of timing evidence on money and output, alluded to
in the preceding discussion of Friedman and Schwartz￿s discussion of monetary factors in the
onset of the Depression and made explicit in Tobin (1965).
19
also typical of twin crises today.
28  When deposits hemorrhage out of the banking system, the
government and the central bank find themselves between a rock and a hard place.  In the 1930s,
providing large amounts of liquidity to the banking system almost certainly would have violated
gold-standard statutes; doing so would have raised questions about whether the authorities
attached priority to the maintenance of the exchange rate peg relative to other social and
economic goals.  But not doing so might have allowed the banking system to come crashing
down, with even more disruptive effects on economic activity.  Except in the United States,
where they remained strangely unperturbed, the authorities generally took steps to prevent the
collapse of banking systems.  In Germany and Austria, for example, they injected just enough
domestic credit to keep the principal banks afloat, thereby limiting the fall in the money
multiplier.  But doing so undermined confidence in the stability of the currency, provoking
capital flight and encouraging the continued conversion of foreign exchange reserves into gold,
thereby accelerating the fall of the gold-reserve multiplier.  Again, it follows that the main engine
of deflation was the banking crisis in the United States but the currency crisis in other countries.
One of the conventional critiques of the literature on twin crises is that timing does not
prove causality.
29  That a banking crisis becomes evident before a currency crisis does not prove
that the former caused the latter.  It could be that anticipations of a subsequent currency crisis led
savers to liquidate domestic-currency-denominated deposits and flee into foreign exchange in30This dynamic was evident in Argentina in the final months of 2001, for example,
although the deposit withdrawals were not enough to provoke a full-blown banking crisis prior to
the actual devaluation.
31The authors argue that Bruening￿s references to a reparations moratorium worked in the
same direction.  Of course, there is a sense in which the reparations tangle and German budget
deficits were two sides of the same coin; strengthening the budget would have weakened the
argument that Germany could not pay.
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order to avoid capital losses due to the eventual devaluation.
30  Ferguson and Temin (2001) show
that Germany was running chronic budget deficits in the first half of 1931 and reason that
expectations that these would be monetized, leading to a currency crisis, provoked the deposit
withdrawals of May and June.
31  Wigmore (1984) argues that anticipations of Roosevelt￿s
decision to take the dollar off gold led to the run on U.S. banks in the interregnum between
FDR￿s election and assumption of office.  The judicious conclusion, then as now, is that the
causality between banking and currency crises was bidirectional.
If expectations of depreciation could destabilize a banking system, then the fact of
depreciation could be broadly stabilizing.  Going off the gold standard freed up monetary policy. 
It allowed the central bank to cut interest rates, relieving banking sector distress.  Grossman
(1994) contrasts a number of explanations for why some countries succeeded in averting banking
crises in the 1930s.  The single most important factor, he finds, was whether a country had
abandoned the gold standard, allowing the central bank to engage more freely in lender-of-last-
resort operations and to jump-start the recovery.  This seems to have been the case in capital-
importing and capital-exporting economies and in industrial and developing countries alike.  
This is in contrast to the experience of the 1990s, when capital-importing emerging
markets saw their financial systems and economies destabilized by depreciation.  Why didn￿t21
depreciation in the 1930s have similarly destabilizing effects?  One can think of several potential
explanations. 
! Foreign deposits were widespread but foreign-currency-denominated deposits were less. 
This was at least one favorable legacy of the gold standard, insofar as a history of fixed
rates made it seem less imperative for foreign depositors to avoid currency risk.
! Foreign-currency denominated loans to the banks￿ domestic clients were similarly less
prevalent.  Hence, depreciation did not destroy the balance sheets of the corporate sector
and aggravate the problem of nonperforming loans.
! Not a few countries with foreign obligations responded to exchange market pressures by
slapping on currency and exchange controls ￿ in effect, they responded like Malaysia in
1998.  This allowed the authorities to inject credit into the banking system without
precipitating the uncontrolled collapse of the currency.  Decoupling from international
financial markets made more sense in the 1930s than the 1990s because the market for
new foreign issues was effectively shut down.
! Finally, a number of countries substituted clear and coherent monetary policy operating
strategies for the gold-standard anchor.  Sweden adopted a price level target not
dissimilar from the inflation targeting regime that has become a popular approach to
anchoring floating exchange rates in recent years.  Britain adopted a dirty float consistent
with an exchange rate that remained stable over the intermediate run.  The
Commonwealth and many of Britain￿s trading partners adopted a policy of following the
pound, albeit more loosely than before, forming what came to be known as the Sterling
Area.  Thus, fears that abandoning the gold standard would unleash another round of32There is less dispute over the two other periods where the gold standard allegedly
inhibited the pursuit of more expansionary policies.  The first time was in 1931, following
Britain￿s devaluation, when the Fed had to hold gold not just to back its own liabilities but also 
government securities in its portfolio; this was the problem of free gold eliminated by the Glass-
Steagall Act of February 1932.  No one to my knowledge has disputed that the Fed needed to
raise rates in the wake of Britain￿s devaluation in order to maintain confidence in the dollar.  The
second time was in January-February 1933, when excess reserves fell to zero and there is no
question that the gold standard bound.
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uncontrolled inflation were quickly dispatched.  This helped to revive confidence in
banking systems. 
All this assumes that the gold standard was a binding constraint on stabilizing
intervention and that its abandonment was a precondition for the adoption of reflationary
policies.  Any attempt to unilaterally reduce interest rates or to unilaterally engage in
expansionary open market operations would have precipitated capital outflows and reserve losses
that endangered the exchange rate peg.  Here was where the absence of international cooperation
was an issue.  A unilateral interest rate reduction would cause capital to flow toward other,
higher interest rate markets, endangering the exchange rate of the initiating country, but there
was no reason why simultaneous reductions by several countries would weaken any one currency
relative to another.
The United States was the one country that arguably was not prevented from taking
unilateral monetary action.  Controversy here centers on the open market operations of April-
August 1932 and whether they were abandoned as a result of fears that continued security
purchases would lead to continued reserve losses, to the point where the dollar would be
attacked.
32  This episode has been revisited by Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (1999) and Hsieh
and Romer (2001), who question whether the open market purchases of the spring and summer33Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (1999) simulate a calibrated price-specie flow model
and show that further increases in domestic credit, undertaken either in October 1930-February
1931 or September 1931-January 1932 would not have exhausted the Fed￿s excess gold reserves
because the Fed held ample amounts of excess gold.  This assumes a linear relationship between
domestic credit creation and reserve losses of a sort that will be familiar to readers from the
monetary approach to the balance of payments.  The authors raise but rule out the possibility of a
speculative attack, which, in balance-of-payments crisis models like Krugman (1979), produce a
sharp nonlinearity when reserves fall to a lower threshold.  In effect, this rules out a priori the
central problem of concern to those who see fears for the stability of the dollar as possibly
constraining the Fed.  Hsieh and Romer argue that there was little perceived likelihood, either in
the markets or in the corridors of the Fed, that such an attack was pending.  Their evidence
mainly concerns forward foreign exchange rates; they show that the forward discount adjusted
for trend reversion implied a maximum probability of 11 per cent of a major U.S. devaluation in
the summer of 1932.  The forward discount displayed no significant correlation with open market
operations.  And, their measure suggests that expectations of a major dollar devaluation actually
dropped during the latter part of the Fed￿s expansionary program.  I would require more evidence
on the volume of activity in the forward market, and on how these forward quotations are
constructed, before being convinced.  There is also the question of whether the Fed aborted its
program for fear of destabilizing the dollar before a larger discount was allowed to emerge, and
whether expectations of this action were what caused the discount to narrow in July.  Hsieh and
Romer￿s qualitative discussion speaks to this question; it focuses on the Harrison Papers, which
do not suggest significant concern within the Fed about the danger to the dollar. But Sumner
(1997) provides qualitative evidence that points in the opposite direction.
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created expectations of dollar devaluation or induced the Fed to draw to curtail those operations
in order to prevent the emergence of such expectations.  This is not the place to become
embroiled in this controversy.
33  But that controversy is one more sign that the United States was
different; again, the gold standard mattered less, while banking crises ￿ and the failure of the
authorities to do what was in their capacity to avert them ￿ mattered more in this, the second
stage of the Great Contraction.
3.  The Recovery
This perspective implicating monetary blunders and constraints in the onset of the slump
suggests a role for corrective monetary action in the recovery.  Just as the gold standard34See Romer (1992) on the U.S. and Jonung (1981) on Sweden.  The same was also true
of emerging markets (see della Paolera and Taylor 1998).  The main exceptions were Germany
and Japan, in which recovery was stimulated by public expenditure on rearmament.  Toward the
end of the 1930s, as military conflict loomed, stimulus from rearmament became general (see for
example Thomas 1983 on Britain).  But this occurred after the period of principal concern here.
35The U.S. case probably overstates the typical degree of monetary stimulus from
devaluation, since the country was also on the receiving end of capital flight from Europe once
the clouds of war darkened.  Romer emphasizes the importance of this factor.  On the other hand,
devaluation would have helped less insofar as the U.S. was a large open economy (for smaller
economies, there would have been no offsetting negative impact on the rest of the world and
hence on export demand).
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prevented central banks from unilaterally pursuing expansionary monetary policies, abandoning
the gold standard could have allowed them to impart an expansionary monetary impulse.  Fiscal
policy played a negligible role in recovery, even in countries like the U.S., the UK and Sweden
where the Keynesian revolution received the most intellectual play.
34  Monetary policy did the
hard lifting.  In some cases like the U.S., the monetary authorities simply cut interest rates and
encouraged the exchange rate to decline; they accommodated an increase in the demand for
money and credit by passively discounting or leaving capital inflows unsterilized.
35  In a few
cases they actively expanded domestic credit but did so cautiously, given the immediacy of
memories of high inflation in the 1920s, the last time the gold standard had been abeyance.  This
reluctance to expand more aggressively, while understandable in the circumstances, is one reason
why the recovery was not more robust.
We can analyze the reorientation of monetary policy using the approach of Cecchetti and
Krause (2001).  These authors study how efficiently central banks minimize a weighted sum of
output and inflation variability.  The measure of monetary policy efficiency is the variance of
output times the variance of inflation, minus the squared covariance of inflation and output. 36The result for Japan is somewhat sensitive to how output is de-trended (and, it turns out,
to whether the sample is broken in 1930 or 1931).  Again, it is not entirely surprising that the
Japanese case is somewhat anomalous.  Unlike most of the other countries, Japan was on the
gold standard only in 1930 and 1931.  Breaking the sample in 1931 rather than 1930 thus puts
twice the weight on gold standard years in the first subsample, and thus leads to a largest
apparent improvement in the efficiency of Japanese monetary policy in the first subperiod.
37Data on the growth of money supplies in the exchange control and floating countries in
the 1930s, in Eichengreen (1992), similarly show that the second group expanded money
supplies more aggressively once gold convertibility was abandoned or controlled.  Note that our
data for Austria and Germany only begin in 1922 and 1925, respectively, due to their
hyperinflations.  Clearly we would observe a very dramatic improvement in the efficiency of
policy in the 1930s if we extended their data series backwards, but this would tell us nothing
about the consequences of abandoning the gold standard.
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(Output is detrended, and the period average is subtracted from the inflation rate.)  The measure
should become smaller as monetary policy improves.  The comparison in Figure 3 is of 1919-30
with 1931-39.  (Output followed very different trends in the 1920s and 1930s; I therefore de-
trend separately for the period 1920-30 and 1931-39, regressing it on a linear time trend in top
panel and log time in the bottom panel.)  
Some of the results here are intuitive, for example that three of the larget gains in
monetary policy efficiency were in Sweden, Britain and Japan, these being three countries where
there was a particularly dramatic reorientation of monetary policy once the gold standard was
abandoned.
36  By comparison, there was not much improvement in French or Belgian monetary
policies, these gold bloc countries having stuck to the old monetary regime until 1934 in Belgium
and 1936 in France.  Austria and Germany had more monetary leeway as a result of their
exchange controls; this renders it somewhat surprising that the efficiency of their monetary
policies did not improve more than in Belgium and France.
37  Spain was not on the gold standard
at all in the interwar period, so it is not surprising that its experience is anomalous; standard38One suspects data problems, particularly with the measurement of output.
39Keynes famously warned of the danger at the time, and the possibility has gained new
relevance with Japan showing signs of having entering a liquidity trap at the end of the 1990s.
40Buying bonds ￿would simply increase the reserves of the banking system by the amount
of government bonds which were purchased with currency.  The currency would go out...but [it]
would immediately go into the banks and from the banks into the federal Reserve Banks.￿  U.S.
Congress (1935), quoted in Wilcox (1984), p.1.
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arguments suggest no reason why its policies should have been more flexible and efficient in the
1930s than in the 1920s.  A straightforward explanation for why policy efficiency appears to
deteriorate in the second decade is that the global macroeconomic environment deteriorated. 
This presumably is also part of the explanation for why the efficiency of U.S. monetary policy
declined slightly in the 1930s, but a larger part is that the relatively efficient monetary policies of
the mid-to-late ￿thirties are swamped by the dreadful policies of 1931-33.  Canada does slightly
better than the U.S. because it left the gold standard somewhat sooner.  Poland is not a case about
which I know enough to pontificate.
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But wasn￿t monetary policy rendered impotent by the liquidity trap?
39  In the 1930s,
nominal interest rates fell to extremely low levels, especially the United States.  With rates so
low, it hardly made sense for banks to lend, as opposed to holding excess reserves.  Expansionary
open market operations that created additional Federal Reserve obligations to the private sector
might simply go into additional bank reserves and, given where the banks held their reserves,
back into the Fed.
40  Equally, so long as households and firms expected deflation to continue, real
interest rates were high (given the zero bound on nominal rates), and potential bank customers
had no incentive to borrow.
In the 1930s, as in the 1990s, whether the supply or the demand for bank loans was the41This is similarly the conclusion of the modern literature on the liquidity trap.  Even if
the interest-rate channel for monetary policy is immobilized by the lower bound on the nominal
rate, a reflationary strategy of pushing down the exchange rate and committing to a future path
for the foreign exchange value of the currency can still help an open economy to escape the
liquidity trap (Svensson 2000, McCallum 2001).
42Adjusted, of course, for any fall in world prices due to the continued deterioration in
global conditions.
43Svensson (2000) observes that pegging the exchange rate in an environment of
deflationary expectations (when it is, if anything, expected to appreciate) may require arbitrarily
large foreign exchange market interventions.  Pegging to gold may thus require arbitrarily large
purchases of gold.  In practice, it was through daily purchases of gold at progressively higher
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binding constraint mattered greatly for effectiveness of policy.  If the problem was less that no
one was willing to lend, given the low-interest-rate environment, than that no one was willing to
borrow, given deflationary expectations and demoralized business conditions, then a monetary
shock could transform the situation.  A sharp change in the exchange rate was an obvious way of
transforming expectations of future prices and policies.
41  For a small country, allowing the
exchange rate to depreciate by, say, 25 per cent (the magnitude of a typical devaluation) implied
an eventual 25 per cent rise in import prices and ultimately in the domestic price level.
42  For a
large country, the eventual rise in prices was smaller, but the direction was the same.  In the short
run, before prices had completed their adjustment, the change in the exchange rate also had the
effect of shifting demand from foreign to domestic goods.  If the authorities wished to prevent
the currency from rebounding too strongly from its initial drop, they could undertake unsterilized
intervention (Britain￿s approach following the establishment of the Exchange Equalisation
Fund), engage in expansionary open market operations, or re-peg the currency to gold at its new
lower level (as the U.S. did in January 1934), allowing the now higher demand for money and
credit to be met by capital and gold inflows.
43  In this case, the fall in the exchange rate was anprices (set by FDR and his ￿kitchen cabinet￿ over the president￿s breakfast) that the dollar￿s rate
of exchange was driven down to lower levels after April 1933.
44Of course, factors other than the liquidity trap (adverse balance-sheet effects due to
deflation, the destruction of information due to bank failures, the elimination of thickness
externalities) could have disrupted the supply of financial-intermediation services, as emphasized
by Bernanke (1983) and analyzed further below.
45Similar arguments can be made for still other countries.  Thus, della Paolera and Taylor
(1998) show that abandonment of the gold standard led to a sharp change in expectations in
Argentina, again consistent with the effectiveness of monetary-cum-exchange-rate policy.
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unequivocal signal that future prices would be higher than current prices; by transforming
deflationary expectations, it pushed down the real interest rate and stimulated borrowing for
investment.  
Temin and Wigmore (1984) show how devaluation of the dollar led to a sharp rise in
activity in capital-goods-producing industries in a matter of months, just as if such a
transformation of expectations had taken place.  The literature on Britain￿s devaluation and
recovery points in a similar direction; it emphasizes the recovery of residential construction (the
housing boom), and what is residential construction if not an investment activity?  Nominal
interest rates declined still further starting in 1932, but this did not prevent British banks from
lending.  Rather, the fall in real interest rates as expectations of deflation were eliminated
stimulated the demand for bank credit.  Both cases thus suggest that it was the failure of the
demand for bank loans, and not any liquidity-trap-related obstacle to their supply, that was the
problem in the Depression.
44  Both cases suggest that this problem could be solved by a
devaluation that convincingly transformed expectations of future prices and monetary policies
and gave the authorities the leeway needed to validate those expectations.
45  The econometric
evidence provides only limited support for the hypothesis of a liquidity trap in the 1930s, but the46Thus, Wilcox (1984) reports estimates showing that the demand for excess reserves was
very (but not completely) flat in the 1930s.
47If the main thing happening in the 1930s was shocks to demand coming from domestic
and international monetary policies, in other words, then the resulting shifts in the aggregate
demand schedule enable us to trace the aggregate supply curve.
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qualitative evidence is if anything still harder to square with the notion that monetary policy was
impotent.
46
Once devaluation transformed expectations and freed up monetary policy, prices began to
rise ￿ or, at least, they stopped falling.  Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) identified a number of
channels through which supply and demand were stimulated.  Raising product prices relative to
wages made production more profitable and stimulated labor demand.  Raising import and export
prices relative to the cost of domestic goods stimulated net exports.  Increased profitability and
sales, future as well as current, raised the value of productive capacity relative to its replacement
cost.  It raised Tobin￿s q, encouraging investment (which, as already noted, tended to lead the
recovery in countries pursuing this policy).
Eichengreen and Sachs report bivariate correlations showing that European countries
devaluing by larger amounts tended to recover more rapidly.  Campa (1990) shows that the
comparison extends to Latin America.  Bernanke and Carey (1996) focus on sticky wages and
aggregate supply; they show that the supply relationship estimated by earlier authors survives a
variety of econometric extensions.   Under the assumption that differences in economic
performance as of the mid-1930s were due to differences in gold standard policies, they show
that the cross-section relationship between real wages and production identifies a component of
the aggregate supply relation.
47  48This schedule goes through the zero-zero point on the figure and has an elasticity of
negative one-half, such that labor￿s share is constant at two thirds.
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This assumption has not gone unquestioned.  Cole, Ohanian and Leung (2002) observe
that the cross-section relationship between the change in real wages and the change in output
(both between 1929 and 1933) is surprisingly diffuse.  Figure 4 shows their labor demand
schedule, derived on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor share of
two-thirds.
48  In some countries, prominently the U.S., the fall in output was larger than the rise
in real wages alone would lead one to predict.  In others, notably France, Holland, and
Switzerland, it was smaller.  It could be that a Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor
share of two-thirds poorly represents the technology of the time.  But no conventional production
function, in conjunction with an explanation for the Great Depression that relies on demand-side
factors alone, can explain why output should have fallen more than predicted by the rise in real
wages in some countries but less than predicted by the rise in real wages in others.  The
implication is that the observed real wage-employment relationship was simultaneously
perturbed by other disturbances.  The reduction in the real wage produced a surprisingly large or
small increase in output and employment, depending on the national case, due to these other
shocks.
The bad news, in this case, is that the real wage-output relationship does not in fact
identify a component of the aggregate supply relation.  The good news, for those who emphasize
the role of gold standard policies, is that the observed correlation then underestimates how much
difference changes in those policies could make for macroeconomic outcomes, ceteris paribus. 
Cole, Ohanian and Leung￿s point, though, is that ceteris was not paribus.  In addition to the effect49Conceivably supplemented by the tendency for New Deal policies to restrict
competition and push up production costs, although the comparison of 1933 with 1929 is a bit
early for the latter set of effects to have plausibly made themselves felt.
50Cooper and Ejarque (1995) provide a model in which capital flows like these can affect
the supply side due to thickness externalities in financial intermediation, but as they note their
model can reproduce only some of the macroeconomic fluctuations of the period.
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of negative demand shocks, the Depression was evidently compounded by negative supply
shocks.  
This interpretation is attractive if it is possible to identify plausible shocks in the
countries concerned.  As noted, four countries in Cole, Ohanian and Leung￿s 17 country sample
lie especially far from the predicted real wage/employment relationship.  As shown in Figure 4,
the U.S. lies far below, while France, the Netherlands and Switzerland lie far above.  For the
U.S., the obvious factor disrupting aggregate supply was the financial crisis.
49  This emphasis on
the collapse of financial intermediation as a supply shifter is consistent with Bernanke￿s
emphasis on the nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis and on the impact of increases in the
cost of credit intermediation.  Early analyses treat bank failures mainly as a determinant of
aggregate demand, operating through the monetary channel.  This analysis, in contrast, suggests
that the banking crisis had an impact on both blades of the aggregate-supply/aggregate-demand
scissors.
As noted, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland did better, in terms of the change in
output, than the rise in their labor costs alone would lead one to predict.  As members of the gold
bloc, they were on the receiving end of capital inflows once other countries￿ gold-standard
parities began to crumble, rendering their economies and financial systems more liquid than
would have been the case otherwise.
50  This, then, could be the mirror image of the U.S. case.  51There were also three bank failures and runs on provincial banks in November 1930,
although Bouvier (1984) questions whether these events in fact constituted a banking crisis.
52Bordo, Erceg and Evans (1997) notes that a standard model of monetary-caused
inflation and deflation, together with wage stickiness due to overlapping contracts, cannot
explain why output in the U.S. recovered as quickly as it did after 1933, especially since real
wages did not decline.  This is a problem for the Romer (1992) story.  The speed of recovery
becomes easier to understand once one admits a role for the restoration of financial stability and
reintermediation due to the looser credit conditions brought about by capital inflows.
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That said, none of these countries escaped banking sector problems entirely.  France
experienced the collapse of a major deposit bank, the Banque Nationale de Credit, in October
1932.
51  In Switzerland, the Banque Populaire had to be restructured in November 1933.  That
these events occurred relatively late in the 1929-33 period suggests that the longer these countries
stayed on the gold standard, the greater became the fragility of their financial systems and
economies.  Thus, in an even longer term comparison (from 1929 through 1935, as in
Eichengreen and Sachs), these three members of the gold bloc should not have performed so
unusually well, while the U.S., now off the gold standard and able to put its banking-sector
problems behind it, should not have performed so exceptionally poorly.  This prediction is borne
out for the U.S., as shown in Figure 5.  Output is now 30 per cent below predicted levels, rather
than 45 per cent, a considerable improvement in just two years.
52  France, the Netherlands and
Switzerland, on the other hand, remain positive outliers, in terms of output, by about the same
extent as in 1933.  By 1935 they were no longer on the receiving end of gold and capital inflows. 
This suggests that there must have been additional factors that also help to explain why output in
the gold bloc countries did not collapse more dramatically as the real wage rose.  What they were
remains, to my mind, one of those mysteries that future research will have to solve.33
4.  Conclusion
One way of characterizing recent research on the Great Depression is as ￿normal
science.￿  There is now a steady stream of publications that add incrementally to existing
knowledge.  Economists recognize the Depression as a natural testing ground for theories of
macroeconomic fluctuations.  Historians have gone beyond the American and British cases that
were once the focal points for archival research.  If this work has limitations, it is that many
economists continue to view the 1920s and 1930s as simply a data set with which to test the
latest fashions in economic theory rather than a period to be understood in its own right, while
historians disregard the economic dimension of the greatest macroeconomic catastrophe of
modern times in favor of its social and psychological aspects. 
The onset of the Depression remains the stage about which there is least consensus,
perhaps unavoidably given the limited ability of macroeconomists to explain turning points.  The
debate continues to revolve around the relative importance of domestic monetary policies and an
unstable international system.  If there is anything approaching a consensus, it is a synthetic view
which admits a role for both factors ￿ for monetary policy mistakes not just in the United States
but also in Germany and, of a different sort, in France, and for the international monetary and
financial system in transmitting those destabilizing impulses to the rest of the world.  It explains
the speed and extent of the subsequent decline in terms of both banking crises and the collapse of
the gold standard, which conspired in placing deflationary pressure to different degrees on
different countries.  And, it explains the eventual recovery in terms of the abandonment of the
gold standard, which facilitated the pursuit of stabilizing monetary policies, but also in terms of
the restoration of stability to banking and financial systems, something that occurred at different34
times in different countries.
One way of understanding the veneer of disputation on this consensus is that different
elements dominated in the United States and other countries.  For the U.S., there is no denying
the role of policy mistakes in the onset of the Depression, whereas for other countries
international transmission via capital and gold flows plays the most important part.  The banking
crisis was the main motor for the downward spiral in the United States, whereas for other
countries the disintegration of the gold-exchange standard was more important.  For most
countries, the movement of wages and prices can largely explain the course of slump and
recovery, but industrial production in the U.S. fell more rapidly than the behavior of real wages
would lead one to predict and remained depressed relative to the international norm for several
years following devaluation of the dollar.  One explanation of the disputes that characterize the
literature is thus that Americanists continue to export the conclusions of research on the United
States to the rest of the world while other country specialists continue to do the opposite.
The other way of understanding these disputes is that economists continue to search for a
unified explanation for the global depression, while historians continue to treat each national
experience as unique.  The contrasts between the experiences of the United States and other
countries drawn in this lecture suggest that neither approach is quite right for understanding this
pivotal period in the development of the 20
th century world economy.35
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